Annals of Health Law
Volume 13
Issue 2 Summer 2004

Article 14

2004

A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating
Harm
Valerie Witmer
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Valerie Witmer A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating Harm, 13 Annals Health L. 589 (2004).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/14

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annals of Health Law by an
authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Witmer: A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating Harm

A Patient Perspective: Focusing on
Compensating Harm
Introduction by Valerie Witmer*
I. INTRODUCTION

Susan J. Schwartz joined the law firm of Corboy & Demetrio following
graduation from Loyola University Chicago School of Law and became a
partner in 1994. Ms. Schwartz is a zealous plaintiffs' advocate whose
practice is centered on representing patients or their families in complex
medical malpractice cases. She has been markedly successful in procuring
large settlements for those who have been harmed as a direct result of
medical professional negligence, and in many cases, her efforts have
secured damage awards in excess of $1 million.
Ms. Schwartz is an active member of several bar associations and serves
on the board of managers of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. She has
also served on the faculty of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy. Ms.
Schwartz's accomplishments as a medical malpractice attorney and patient
advocate have earned her frequent invitations -to lecture locally and
nationally at seminars, continuing legal education programs, and
conferences on topics of trial practice techniques, alternative methods of
dispute resolution, and the analysis of medical legal claims.
At the Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Annual Health Law
and Policy Colloquium, Ms. Schwartz spoke passionately about the patient
perspective on the medical malpractice crisis. Her remarks elucidated the
need to preserve the tort system in order to give patients a voice against
negligent healthcare providers and revealed the failure of non-economic
damage caps to enhance the availability and quality of healthcare. This
article will expand upon the reasons the tort system is not to blame for the
medical malpractice crisis. Further, this article will explore why tort reform
is not a viable solution to the crisis and why the tort system must be
preserved as a forum for patient advocates, like Susan Schwartz, to ensure
that medical professional negligence-induced injuries do not go
Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, class of 2004. Ms. Witmer is a
member of the Annals of Health Law and will be the Technical Production Editor for 200405.
*
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uncompensated.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TORT REFORM
A. The Tort System Is Not the Leading Cause of
the Medical MalpracticeCrisis
The tort system has come under attack in recent years as another medical
malpractice crisis has reared its head, but the system can and must be
defended. While critics of the tort system have identified out-of-control
litigation as the primary culprit, there are several much more likely suspects
that must be investigated as potential causes of the crisis. These factors
include: (1) the accounting system utilized by malpractice insurers to set
premium rates; (2) malpractice insurers' declining investment income; (3)
increasing reinsurance rates for medical malpractice insurers; (4) falling
profits in the malpractice insurance industry; and (5) malpractice insurers'
exemption from antitrust laws.1 Although these factors were outside the
scope of Ms. Schwartz's remarks, they are cited by patient advocates, like
Ms. Schwartz, in defending against assertions that the tort system is
primarily to blame for the malpractice crisis. Therefore, these factors and
their contributions to premium rate increases will be explored hereinafter.
The unique accounting method used by malpractice insurers to set
premium rates contributes to periodic rate hikes and is consequently a
noteworthy suspect in the medical malpractice crisis.2 Insurance companies
3
use an accounting system called Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP).
Under SAP, insurers set their rates according to their anticipated costs for a
given year.4 The largest component of malpractice insurers' anticipated
costs is incurred losses 5 , which in theory, represent expected future
payments on claims reported in the current year.6 The argument set forth by
critics of the tort system-that increased frequency and severity of
malpractice claims is responsible for driving up malpractice insurance

1.

PatientAccess Crisis: The Role of MedicalLitigation,House Comm. on the Judiciary,

108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Jay Angoff, Counsel, Roger G. Brown & Associates)
[hereinafter Angoff Testimony]. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No.
GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 4 (June 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov [hereinafter
GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES].
2. Angoff Testimony, supranote 1, at 2.
3. Id.
4. GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 16.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 20.
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rates 7-breaks down when one recognizes that insurance companies have
incentives to overstate their incurred losses.8
First, insurers may overstate their incurred losses in order to justify
increasing premium rates and generate higher profits. 9 Second, since
increasing incurred losses translates into lower income for the insurer, there
10 Finally,
are tax benefits associated with overstating incurred losses.
insurers today have inflated their incurred losses because they are trying to
recover lost investment income, not because they have been making more
or larger payouts on malpractice claims.11 In light of these incentives for
insurers to artificially inflate incurred losses, it is apparent that incurred
losses do not accurately reflect expected future payments on reported
claims. Thus it becomes equally clear that increases in incurred losses, if
and when they occur, are not commensurate with increased frequency and
severity of malpractice claims. Therefore, increased litigation of
malpractice claims is not the culprit in this scenario; rather the incentives
created by the SAP accounting principles may be one possible cause behind
rising malpractice insurance premiums.
Another suspect in the crisis is malpractice insurers' declining
investment income. Medical malpractice insurers make money not by
collecting more premium income than they pay out in claims, 12 but by
investing their premium income in bonds and other conservative
instruments. 13 Investment income is particularly important for malpractice
insurers who invest their premiums for approximately six years between the
time a claim occurs and the time that claim is paid. 14 When investment
returns are high, insurers can continue to operate profitably even when
losses on malpractice claims exceed income from premiums 15 because their
"investment income more than 16makes up for any difference between [their]
premiums and [their] payouts."'
The investment income on which malpractice insurers so heavily rely has
a direct impact on premium rates. State insurance regulations require that
medical malpractice insurers reduce their premium rates in consideration of

7. Health Coalition on Liability & Access, Issue Briefing 2003, at http://www.hcla.org/
2003 briefingbook/2003BriefingBook.pdf.
8. Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 2-3.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at2.
13. GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 24.
14. Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 2.
15. GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 26.
16. Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 2.
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expected investment income.17 Consequently, when insurers expect their
investment income to be high, they will reduce their premium rates
accordingly and when insurers anticipate low investment income, premium
rates escalate to cover a larger portion of insurers' costs.' 8 The latter
scenario has prevailed in recent years.
While some bonds have performed better than the stock market as a
whole, annual yields on the bonds that comprise approximately eighty
percent of malpractice insurers' investment income have declined steadily
since 2000 and fallen overall since 1995.19 The United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) examined the average investment returns of the
fifteen largest medical malpractice insurers of 2001 and found that "the
average return fell from about 5.6 percent in 2000 to an estimated 4.0
percent in 2002. "20 Although none of these insurers experienced net
investment losses during this period, the decrease in investment income
required a proportional increase in premium income, in the form of a rate
hike, in order for the insurers to maintain their level of income. 2 1 In light of
malpractice insurers' reliance on income from investment assets, it is clear
that poor market performance has driven premium rate hikes.
Escalating reinsurance rates may also help to drive premium rates up.
Increasing reinsurance rates have raised malpractice insurers' aggregate
costs, and malpractice insurers have passed those costs along to insureds in
the form of higher premiums.22 Just like the people and entities they insure,
insurance companies often purchase reinsurance to cover losses they cannot
afford to pay.23 Critics of the litigation system contend that reinsurance
rates are rising because it is becoming more risky and expensive to provide
reinsurance to the medical malpractice market.24 However, this argument
ignores the reality that reinsurance rates increased across the board as a
direct result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.25 In light of the
malpractice insurance industry's dependence on market performance, 26 it
should come as no surprise that reinsurance premiums are also affected by
events shaping the world economy. As Jay Angoff pointed out in his
17. GAO, PUB. No. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 25 (Aug. 2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov [hereinafter GAO, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE],.

18.

Id.

19.

GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 24-25.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.at 4-5.
Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 2.

24.

GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 32.

25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 24.
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testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[t]he re-insurance
market is an international market, affected by international events, and the
cost of re-insurance for commercial lines ... increased far more [after the
September 1lth attacks], due to fears related to terrorism (and completely
unrelated to medical malpractice). 27 This begs the conclusion, once again,
that litigation of medical malpractice claims is not primarily to blame for
premium rate hikes.
The declining profitability of the malpractice insurance industry, due to
factors unrelated to medical malpractice litigation, may cause insurers to
raise their rates. Beginning in the late 1990s, selling malpractice insurance
became a considerably less profitable enterprise, despite premium rate
hikes.2 8 Those who blame falling profits on increasing frequency and
severity of malpractice claims are not telling the complete story. The
phenomena described above-insurers' declining investment income and
escalating reinsurance rates-have contributed significantly to insurers'
declining profitability, resulting in a negative rate of return for some
insurers.29 In addition, during the 1990s, competition in the malpractice
insurance market was fierce, and high investment returns allowed insurers
30
to offer low premium rates in order to attract business. In retrospect, some
of those insurers reduced their rates too much, rendering them unprofitable,
and in some cases, insolvent.3 1 Confronted with plummeting profits, some
large insurers pulled out of the business, thus reducing the price
competition that existed through much of the 1990s. 32 In the absence of
price competition, the remaining insurers were able to further increase
33 Clearly,
premium rates to cover a larger portion of anticipated losses.
there are factors other than malpractice claims at work in this scenario,
which are largely responsible for spikes in premium rates.
Finally, the insurance industry's limited exemption from federal antitrust
laws could potentially allow insurers to collectively raise premium rates
without fear of prosecution if and when they are so inclined. Unlike most
other industries, the insurance industry is exempt from federal regulation
pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which states in relevant part:
(a) State regulation

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 2.
GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 28.
Id.
Id. at4.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at31.
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The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance .... 34
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was intended primarily to preserve state
regulation of the insurance industry.35 Secondarily, the Act was meant to
provide insurance companies with limited exemption from the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act for certain
'36
cooperative practices determined to constitute the "business of insurance.
Despite the fact that Congress did not intend the McCarran-Ferguson Act to
give insurance companies a blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws,
uncertainty as to what constitutes the "business of insurance" has allowed
insurance companies to collectively raise premium rates-an activity which
would otherwise be prohibited under the federal antitrust laws.37
When market conditions are bleak, as they are today, insurers have
obvious incentives to agree amongst each other to raise premium rates to
compensate for lost investment income.38 Since insurers enjoy limited
exemption from federal antitrust laws, they can do so without fear of
prosecution.39 While there is no indication of the extent to which this
concerted behavior is occurring today, evidence from the last medical
malpractice insurance crisis "supports the conclusion that insurance
companies ...

have collectively

raised prices. ' '4

Such cooperative

practices are another potential cause of the medical malpractice crisis,
having nothing to do with medical malpractice claims.
In light of the preceding arguments, it is apparent that the tort system is
not the leading cause of the medical malpractice crisis. Considering the
34.

Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 3; McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011

(2000).
35. Eric Peter Gillett, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption, Who Has the
Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAc. L.J. 261, 265 (1985).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
McCarran-FergusonAct of 1945: Reconceiving the FederalRole of Insurance Regulation,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1993).
37. Gillett, supra note 35, at 265; Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 3.
38. Angoff Testimony, supra note 1, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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slough of factors, other than the litigation of malpractice claims, that have
contributed significantly to the problems facing the medical malpractice
insurance industry, the solution does not necessarily lie in tort reform.
B. Even if the Tort System Is a ContributingFactor in the Medical
Malpractice Crisis,Damage Caps Are Not a Viable Solution
Even if, as critics contend, the tort system is a contributing factor in the
malpractice crisis, caps on non-economic damages are not the answer for a
variety of reasons. First, damage caps deny patients the right to be fully
compensated for medical professional negligence-induced injuries and
41
impose an unfair burden on the most catastrophically injured patients.
Legislation that arbitrarily limits the amount injured patients can recover
will systematically deny full recovery to patients who require more than the
statutory amount to be made whole. Second, damage caps will not solve
the malpractice problem because they will not reduce the occurrence of
medical professional negligence that generates malpractice claims. Finally,
damage caps promise to have a negative impact on the availability and
quality of healthcare. Removing the threat of large damage awards will
enable negligent physicians to continue to practice medicine without fear of
a substantial penalty and without an incentive to minimize the risk of injury
to their patients. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. However,
as an initial matter, in order to appreciate the shortcomings of damage caps,
it is necessary to understand the measures proposed by tort reform
advocates.
Recent tort reform efforts have been aimed, in large part, at limiting the
monetary damages patients can recover in actions against negligent
healthcare providers. 42 One of the most sought-after tort reforms by
physicians and hospitals is a ceiling on the amount a patient may recover
43
for non-economic damages in any given case. Non-economic damages
represent compensation for human losses. 44 Such non-monetary losses
include, inter alia, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of

William R. Padget, Damage Limitations in Medical MalpracticeActions: Necessary
41.
Legislation or UnconstitutionalDeprivation?, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 215, 224-25 (2003); Randall

R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Painand Suffering ", 83 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 908, 909-10 (1989).
42. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. No. OTA-BP-H-1 19,
IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 1-2 (Sept. 1993), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/ns20/yearf.html.
43. David Karp, The MisdirectedSearchfor Malpractice Reform, MED. ECON., Oct. 13,
1997, at http://me.pdr.net/me/content/joumals/mi/data/I 997/maa/maa202.html.
44. Symposium, Anatomy of a Malpractice Case From a Litigator's Perspective, 6
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 279, 295 (2003).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

7

Annals of Health
Law,ofVol.
13 [2004],
Iss. 2, Art. 14
Annals
Health
Law

[Vol. 13

enjoyment of life.45 In the last two years, lawmakers have proposed federal
legislation that includes placing caps on non-economic damages. Congress
is currently considering a bill that would, in relevant part, impose a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages. 46 The previous Congress
considered at least two similar bills containing nearly identical provisions
regarding non-economic damages.47
Tort reform proponents believe that out-of-control non-economic
damage awards are responsible for premium rate hikes, the threat of large
damage awards forces physicians to practice defensive medicine which in
turn increases the cost of health care, and caps on non-economic damages
are an appropriate solution to the medical malpractice crisis. 48 However,
there is another side to the story which must not be ignored. As discussed
in Part II, supra, litigation of medical malpractice claims is not the leading
cause of the malpractice crisis, and as such, tort reform should not be
focused on as the only appropriate solution to the problem. Physicians'
misguided belief that they need to practice defensive medicine in order to
avoid being sued and the detrimental effects of non-economic damage caps
will be explored in the remainder of this section.
Many physicians contend that the threat of malpractice litigation with
potentially large damage awards forces them to practice defensive medicine
(i.e., provide extraordinary or unnecessary tests or treatment) in order to
avoid being sued. 49 However, physicians do not need to practice defensive
medicine in order to avert lawsuits. Rather, they must simply provide
medical care at the level accepted as reasonable by the medical profession.5 °
A series of claims studies conducted by the Physician Insurers Association
of America (PLAA) revealed that physicians got into legal trouble because
they failed to provide routine medical care reasonably required by the
medical profession. 5 1 For example, many of the physicians who were
adjudged guilty of negligence "[o]mitted routine exams or tests," "[d]idn't
take adequate medical and family histories," "[d]idn't communicate
effectively with patients or other physicians, "[d]idn't follow the patient
appropriately," and "[d]idn't meaningfully document their care and
45. Health Coalition on Liability & Access, supra note 7, at 1.
46. Padget, supra note 41, at 218; Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. § 4(b) (2003).
47. Help, Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2002,
H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. § 4(b) (2002); Common Sense Medical Malpractice Reform Act of
2001, S. 1370, 107th Cong. § 6(a) (2001).
48. GAO, INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, supra note 1, at 1; GAO, ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE, supranote 17, at 1.
49. GAO, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 17, at 1.
50. Karp, supra note 43.

51.

Id.
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treatment., 5 2 These physicians were not sued for their failure to provide
5 3 The suits were brought
extraordinary or unnecessary tests or treatment.
and the physicians lost because they failed to follow accepted medical
practices.54
The results of the PIAA studies suggest that defensive medicine is not
55
According to liability
what is needed to prevent malpractice claims.
56 Physicians must identify
experts, the solution lies in loss prevention.
"those conditions that pose the greatest risk of medical injury to their
patients and the greatest liability risks to themselves," and "promulgate,
disseminate, and then follow guidelines acceptable to them for diagnosing
and treating those conditions. 57 They must carefully and thoroughly58
document the care they provide in order to protect patients from injury.
Further, they must nurture doctor-patient relationships by communicating
with their patients in a clear and effective manner about their diagnosis and
treatment. 59 In short, physicians must practice good medicine. Only then
will the malpractice crisis begin to subside.
Non-economic damage caps are not a viable solution to the medical
malpractice crisis because they deprive patients of their right to full, fair
and reasonable compensation for their injuries and unfairly burden the most
catastrophically injured patients.60 Patients who are harmed as a direct
result of medical professional negligence are entitled to full, fair, and
reasonable compensation for the extent and duration of their injuries, which
6
will not be possible if a cap is placed on non-economic damages. 1 Despite
criticisms by tort reform advocates that non-economic damage awards are
unpredictable, pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other intangible losses are undeniably legitimate elements of
damages and must be fully compensated in order to make the injured
patient whole. 62 Therefore, legislation which arbitrarily restricts the amount
of non-economic damages patients can recover will deprive patients of the
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

56.

Karp, supra note 43.

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.

60.

Symposium, Presentation: Tort Reform 2003, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309,

309 (2003).
61. Medical Liability Issues Testimony: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health,
Comm. on House Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Donald J.
Palmisano, President, American Medical Association).
62. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 41, at 911.
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right to be fully compensated for their injuries and will impose an unfair
burden on the most catastrophically injured patients.
The tort system exists to ensure that patients receive full redress for
injuries inflicted by negligent defendants. 63 Non-economic damage caps
"creat[e] two classes of medical malpractice victims, those with serious
injuries whose recovery is limited by the caps and those with minor injuries
who receive full compensation. '"64 If a jury determines that a patient is
entitled to $1 million in non-economic damages, but the legislature imposes
a $250,000 ceiling on the amount she can recover, that patient is not
receiving full redress for her injuries. 65 As the foregoing example
demonstrates, a cap on non-economic damages will affect only those
patients for whom an award in excess of the cap is necessary to provide full,
fair, and reasonable compensation.6 6
As Ms. Schwartz points out in the transcript that follows, the detrimental
effects of non-economic damage caps will be felt most by housewives and
elderly patients whose economic damages are limited, and children who
have an entire lifetime of suffering ahead of them as a result of medical
professional negligence. The housewife who went into the hospital for
appendicitis and developed a complication, caused by negligence, resulting
in brain damage which requires her to have round-the-clock care will not
have economic damages from loss of wages. Similarly, the elderly patient
who lost both her legs as a result of medical neglect will have nominal
monetary losses from lost wages because she is retired. Furthermore, her
losses from future medical expenses will be limited because following the
amputation, she will need little continuing care. Neither of these patients
suffered huge economic losses, but that does not mean that their lives were
not catastrophically affected. These patients suffered, and will continue to
suffer from tremendous pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of
enjoyment of life. A $250,000 non-economic damage award is grossly
inadequate to compensate them for such suffering.
On the flipside, a five-year-old girl who suffered paralyzing injuries at
birth due to medical negligence during her delivery will have massive
economic damages. Her future medical expenses for continuing care will
be astronomical, and she will have significant lost future earnings.
However, despite a large economic damage award, a cap on non-economic
damages will deprive her of full recovery for the injuries she suffered at the
63. Padget, supra note 41, at 222-23.
64. Id.at 222 (intemal quotations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Philip H. Corboy et al., Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law as
Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 183, 213 (1999).
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hands of a negligent physician. This young girl faces an entire lifetime of
pain and suffering, for which $250,000 will not begin to make her whole.
Victims of medical malpractice must have a voice against negligent
healthcare providers. The tort system is the only forum in which patients
can exercise their fundamental right to be made whole when they are
harmed as a result of medical professional negligence. Non-economic
damage caps threaten to undermine the goal of the tort system by depriving
patients of their right to be fully compensated for their injuries and placing
an unfair burden on the most catastrophically injured patients. In light of
these detrimental effects, damage caps are not an acceptable solution to the
malpractice problem.
Moreover, caps on non-economic damages will not remedy the
malpractice problem for the very simple reason that they do not reduce the
occurrence of medical professional negligence-induced injuries that land
medical malpractice cases in court.6 7 In fact, they may have the opposite
effect. The tort system deters medical professional negligence by imposing
68
complete liability on physicians and their insurers. Removing the threat
of large malpractice claims may have the opposite effect of permitting
physicians to engage in69negligent conduct knowing that they are shielded
from complete liability.
Medical malpractice law gives physicians and other healthcare providers
broad latitude to make medical judgments.7 ° Physicians are not expected to
7
be perfect or to achieve a positive outcome in every case. 1 They are only
expected to have "the skill possessed by the average member of the
profession in good standing. . . 'giv[ing] the medical profession ... the
privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups [of tort
defendants], of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by
adopting their own practices.,, 72 This standard of care eases the burden
placed on defendant physicians by shielding them from liability so long as
they provide care at a level accepted as reasonable by the medical
73
profession, regardless of their ability to successfully treat or cure a patient.
The non-economic damage caps sought by physicians and healthcare
providers will only benefit those providers who lose, in spite of the relaxed
67. Karp, supra note 43.
68. Padget, supra note 41, at 227-28.
69. Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of
Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient
Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 11, 60 (1991).
70. Karp, supra note 43.
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 11.
73. Karp, supra note 43.
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standard of care. 74 Physicians who provide sub-standard care and are
adjudged guilty of negligence will no longer have to pay a substantial sum
to the patients they harm.75 Absent the threat of a substantial payout,
incompetent doctors will be allowed to continue to practice medicine
without an adequate incentive to take precautions against unreasonable risks
of harm to their patients. 76 In other words, caps on non-economic damages
"don't prevent malpractice litigation; they only alleviate the pain of being
sued as losing a case. '' 7
III. CONCLUSION
The tort system is not the leading cause of the medical malpractice crisis
and therefore, tort reform should not be focused on as the only appropriate
solution. Several factors, having nothing to do with medical malpractice,
have contributed to the premium rate hikes at the root of the malpractice
problem, which include: the accounting principles by which malpractice
insurers determine premium rates; malpractice insurers' declining
investment income; escalating reinsurance rates; falling profits throughout
the malpractice insurance industry; and malpractice insurers' exemption
from antitrust laws. In light of this line-up of likely suspects, casting
malpractice litigation as the primary culprit in the medical malpractice crisis
is a questionable endeavor.
Even if the tort system were a contributing factor to the crisis, the answer
to the malpractice problem does not lie in capping the amount of noneconomic damages an injured patient can recover. Non-economic damage
caps promise to cause a host of detrimental effects, which include:
depriving injured patients of their fundamental right to be made whole;
placing an unfair burden on the most catastrophically injured patients by
systematically denying them full recovery for their losses; and allowing
incompetent physicians to continue to practice medicine and harm patients
without fear of a substantial payout. In the transcript that follows, Ms.
Schwartz passionately explains that from the patient's perspective, caps on
non-economic damages are not the answer to the medical malpractice crisis
so long as medical professionals continue to engage in the negligent
conduct that lands medical malpractice claims in court.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Cleckley & Hariharan, supra note 69, at 60.
Karp, supra note 43.
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